2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in Burma 1944-45


CHAPTER 4

THE BREAKOUT FROM THE BRIDGEHEAD

The battle of Kule marked the turning point of the bridgehead fighting, for it was the first blow of a series which cracked the Japs cordon round the bridgehead and opened the way for the advance on Mandalay. It was probably the stiffest fight the Battalion had in Burma, and it will therefore be described in some detail.

Kule is a small village lying one mile to the South of Pear, as already mentioned, and contains the only crossing of a swamp and chaung connecting the Lakes East of Pear with the Irrawaddy. One mile to the North-East are three features which came to be known as ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE.
On February 7th the Battalion was on Pear, and in the afternoon received a warning order to prepare for the attack next day, the 8th. At first light the Battalion moved down to Tit, and here joined up with half a squadron of 150th Regt. R.A.C. (Grant Tanks). Although we had tanks, other support was very poor, the Artillery being limited to 15 rounds per gun for the whole day. There was also a small Air strike of half a squadron of Hurribombers. One platoon of M.M.G.’s were under command.

The advance started with “A” and “D” Companies leading, but as the ground narrowed between Pear and the river, “D” dropped behind “A.” As the end of this defile was reached, the track slipped under the third tank, which fell about 15 feet on to the river bank below, and the track was for a time impassable. “D” Coy. now pushed out to the East to cover the left flank, while “A” advanced towards the village half a mile away. No opposition was met until the leading troops had almost reached the hedge surrounding the village, and this was quickly brushed aside. About 50 yards inside the village, however, “A” Coy. came under considerable fire from snipers in trees. Capt. Maycock was wounded seriously in the leg, and Lieut. Bailey took over the Company. “B” Coy. was now sent up to reinforce ‘ A,” and together a little more ground was gained. At about 1700 hrs. the C.O. decided that we should dig in where we were, with the platoon of machine guns in support.

While digging was in progress, the Jap kept up considerable sniping fire, and as it grew dark he became bolder. Small parties started crawling up to the perimeter. There was no wire available, and in several places huts just outside the perimeter gave an excellent covered approach to the enemy.

Throughout the night the Japs kept attacking first one part 0f the perimeter and then another. The bulk of the fighting was on “A” and ‘B” Companies’ fronts. One platoon of “B” Company was pushed back about ten yards into a chaung, but there they held. Towards dawn an officer and five Japs crawled up with the intention of silencing “A” Company’s 2inch mortar. The officer leapt into the mortar pit and, shouting “Banzai !“ started laying about the No. of the mortar with his sword. Company H.Q. immediately counter-attacked and the officer and his party were killed.

After it got light, the sniping continued, and the position was none too satisfactory. However, about 0900 hrs. a Company of the 4/6 Gurkhas arrived and one troop of tanks. The C.O. then issued orders for the clearing of the rest of the village, the 4/6 Gurkhas on the right with the tanks, and one platoon of “B” Company and the Pioneer Platoon on the left. Unfortunately the Gurkhas were late in starting, and the Pioneer Platoon came under heavy fire from snipers, suffering nine casualties in ten minutes. In getting out the wounded, “B” Company also sustained casualties. A second co-ordinated attack was then made, this time with great success. All the North side of the village was cleared, allowing the 3/6 Rajputana Rifles (62 Bde.) to pass through and capture Able, Baker, and Charlie, which were not very strongly held.

The above attack on the North side of Kule was carried out by Lieut. Coombe and his platoon, working along a narrow strip of country with open ground on their right and a deep chaung on the left. They stormed their way along and cleared the ground for some 200 yards. In all they accounted for one officer and 19 O.R.’s killed, and captured one M.M.G., 2 L.M.G.’s, 1 grenade discharger and one sword, together with a number of rifles, and a quantity of equipment and documents. Their own casualties were nil.

During that night there were one or two Jitter Parties round the perimeter, and a scare when a post near the river thought it heard boats being rowed close by. This proved to be unfounded. The next day in the morning the Battalion was relieved, and moved back to Tit for two days’ rest.

Around Kule we counted over 70 Jap bodies, including four officers. One of these was identified as Col. Asano Kuroichi, commander of the 119th Infantry Regiment. Our booty included two M.M.G.’s, 5 L.M.G.’s, 3 grenade dischargers, and four swords.

The success of this operation was greatly assisted by the support given us by the 150th Regt. R.A.C. and the 4th Indian Fd. Regt. I.A., while the M.G. Bn. 11th Sikh Regt. did magnificent work on the perimeter. The Jap always makes for our M.M.G. ‘s, and one of the guns had three dead Japs within two yards of its position.
This attack earned the special congratulations of the Divisional Commander. Real head*ay had at last been made in breaking out from the bridgehead, and the period of defensive fighting was at an end.

Back at Tit the Bn. went into Bde. reserve, reverting to command of 64 Bde. Our somewhat depleted ranks were made up by reinforcements consisting of 6 officers and about 100 O.R. s. Major Pickett (King’s Regt.) arrived to take over Second-in-Command from Major Hodder, who left the Battalion shortly afterwards. Majors Sykes (Y. & L) and Lash (L.F.), Capt. Mould (Foresters), and Lieuts. Lund and Bain, M.B.E. all joined during this period. Lieut. Bain had served previously with the 1st Battalion in Africa, an4 had escaped when taken prisoner of war. His stay, as it turned out, was unfortunately to be only a short one, as he was wounded on the 2nd March. At this time also, Capt. Lord, who had taken over as Adjutant from Capt. Fisher when the latter was evacuated sick just before the crossing of the Irrawaddy, also went sick and his place was taken by Capt. Stuart.

On the 12th February the Bn. moved South again through Singu, important town on the river two miles South of Kule, and terminus of the road from Mandalay, which had been cleared by the 1/6 Gurkhas after a stiff fight. The objective was the village of Ngasingu, about three miles along the Mandalay road and slightly to the North of it. A considerable amount of opposition was met, however, and in the scrub and long grass, which covered all that stretch of country lying immediately behind Singu, it was extremely difficult to locate the enemy and clear him out. It was not until late in the afternoon of the 13th, after an attack supported by tanks, that the Japs withdrew, and the Bn. went into a perimeter at a small place called Myingan, on the road itself about a quarter of a mile from Mgasingu. Our Medical Officer, Capt. A. M. Ogilvie, R.A.M.C., who had been with the Battalion three years, was killed in this operation while giving aid to a wounded man in a very exposed position. His death was a very sad loss to the Battalion. He, and indeed all his stretcher-bearers, many of whom themselves became casualties during these operations, were an example of coolness and courage under fire at all times. The same day Capt. Whitmore, Lieut. Coombe, and 2/Lt. Buckle were wounded, and the Battalion lost Serjeant “Sailor” Bennett, “A” Coy., who was killed.

During the next few days efforts to advance farther down the Mandalay road in the face of strong opposition were made by the other two units of 64 Bde., with, however, only limited success. The Bn. went into reserve at Singu on the bank of the river, to enjoy a well-earned rest. We had an opportunity to wash and bathe. The liquor ration and canteen stores arrived. Worn-out clothing and equipment was exchanged and, generally speaking, we put our house in order. “C” Coy., who lost both Capt. Whitmore and Capt. Mould, who was accidentally injured by a grenade shortly after Myingan, was now taken over by Lieut. Bailey. The four company commanders, who were always raised to the rank of Major if not already holding that rank, now were Majors Sykes (“ A “), Tipler (“ B “), Bailey (“ C “), and Lash (“ D “).

It became apparent during this period, which was one of intense patrol activity for the other two Bns. of the Bde., and to a lesser extent for ourselves, that there were a large number of Japs still in the area. The bridgehead now had its centre round Kule, the new ferry being in operation, and we had gained control of the end of the Mandalay road in the Singu area, but attempts to advance farther produced violent reaction from the Japs. Both 1/6 Gurkhas and 4/10 Baluch were viciously shelled and attacked in their positions. Singu itself, where Div. H.Q. had been set up, was shelled. During one night the enemy infiltrated back into Kule, and attempts were made to disrupt our cross-river traffic. The Jap was, in fact, preparing his second attempt to drive in the bridgehead, and he did, in fact, during this period announce in his English News Bulletin that: “Having allowed the whole of the 19th Indian Division to get across the Irrawaddy, the Imperial Japanese Army have driven them back into the river and eliminated the Singu bridgehead.”

The Jap was not, however, allowed to continue with his counterattacks for long, for a Divisional attack to break out in strength and move South towards Mandalay was planned to start on the 26th. The Bn. left Singu on the 22nd and for three days returned to Myingan, to allow the Baluch to get a few days’ rest in Singu, before this attack began.

The first phase of this attack was to be an advance along the line of the Mandalay road, to be carried out by 64 Bde. This was to be followed almost immediately by the other two Bdes. operating down the right flank, between the road and the river, and constituting the main threat to the enemy position.

The attack by 64 Bde. was planned in four phases, all of which it was hoped would be completed in one day. Phase 1 was to be the task of 1/6 Gurkhas. Phases 2 and 4 were to be carried out by the Battalion, while Phase 3 was to be completed by the Baluch. This, as it turned out, was a somewhat ambitious programme, as it was not until March 2nd, five days later, that the Battalion occupied the village of Nyaungwun, the objective of Phase 4.

1/6 Gurkhas completed Phase 1 on the 26th, although not without fairly heavy casualties. The Battalion then passed through, but although little opposition was met, the difficult nature of the ground, which at this stage was mostly tall elephant grass and belts of bamboo, made progress slow. The night found the Battalion with two Companies (“B” and ” D “) astride the Mandalay road, but some 500 yards short of its objective for Phase 2. On the 27th the Baluch passed through, but in spite of fighting all day and gaining some ground, they did not reach the objective, for Phase III.

It should be mentioned here that the ground was most difficult. The Mandalay road at this stage runs between an extensive lake on the West side, whilst overlooking it from the East are steep-sided hills covered in thick bamboo jungle. It was therefore virtually a bottleneck, unsuitable for tanks, easily defended and allowing no room for manoevre. The capture of such a position when held by the Jap, who is a most stout-hearted infantryman, fighting, as he normally does, literally to the last man and the last round, produced bitter fighting. And it may be added that no air strike was available to help as the Air was needed elsewhere.

The following day the Bn. passed through the Baluch and attacked with the object of capturing the village of Ngwedaung, which was the objective for Phase III. By late afternoon a foothold had been obtained in the outskirts of the village. Enemy opposition was, however, still strong. Japs kept infiltrating round the flanks of the two leading Companies (“ A” and “D “), and as darkness fell the Bn. withdrew slightly into a hastily formed perimeter in the jungle a few hundred yards short of the village. It was an anxious moment. It was found that the enemy had blocked the road behind us, and the Bn. mules and various vehicles which were on their way back to a safer area for the night were shot up and suffered casualties, Owing to the presence of mines, considerable difficulty had been met with during the day in getting vehicles of any kind along the only road available, and, as may be imagined, this hampered the supply situation considerably. An ambulance jeep and a carrier had been destroyed completely by powerful mines and all their occupants killed during the day.

The night, however, was quiet and patrols next morning found that the Jap had withdrawn from the village of Ngwedaung, and a screen was put out to prevent its re-occupation. The Bn. remained in its position for the day and re-organised.

On the 2nd, the Bn. set out to complete Phase IV and it was found that the enemy had withdrawn, so that the village of Nyaungwun was reached without incident. It being still early in the day, we were ordered to continue the advance down the Mandalay road in the direction of Pyindaung, a village which existed only on the map. In this area the leading Companies (“ A” and” D “) came up against another enemy rearguard position. Fighting developed, the Bn. suffering casualties amounting to 3 killed and 16 wounded, amongst them Lieut. Bain, before withdrawing slightly and forming a perimeter for the night. The following day the attack was resumed, but as the enemy were in well dug-in positions astride the road, the Bn. by-passed the opposition by swinging South-west down to the village of Shwepyi, which was reached without further opposition. There was, however, a little shelling towards the end of the day.

 

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