2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in Burma 1944-45
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The offensive operations to re-occupy Burma, which may be said to have begun with the defeat of the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal in May 1944, were the first of any size that the Battalion had taken part in during the War. In 1940, and again in 1941, the Battalion had seen service on the North-West Frontier of India, but subsequently had spent most of the period up to the autumn of 1944 in training, mainly in the Madras district of Southern India.
When the 19th Indian Division was formed, the Battalion was one of the first to join it. By December, 1943, the Division had completed its Jungle Warfare training near Nilambur in Malabar, and, under the vigorous leadership of its commander, Major-General T. W. Rees, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., had been welded into an effective fighting force, proud of its title “The Dagger Division” which it took from its badge, an upraised hand grasping a dagger in gold on a red background.
A brief outline of the composition of the Division must be given here. The three brigades, the 62nd, 64th and 98th Indian Infantry Brigades, were each composed of one British, one Indian, and one Gurkha battalion. There were the usual supporting arms and services, including both British and Indian Artillery, Madras Sappers and Miners, R.I.A.S.C., etc. The units of 64th Brigade, to which the Battalion belonged, were, besides ourselves, the 5/10 Baluch Regiment and the 1/6 Gurkha Rifles. The Brigade was commanded by Brigadier G. A. Bain.
We had expected to be sent to Burma shortly after the end of the Nilamur training period, but the Division was then selected for Combined Operations training, and this, first at Nasik (Dryshod) and then on the Bombay coast at Madh Island, kept us extremely busy until the beginning of June. It was a bitter disappointment when we were told that, owing to the shortage of the necessary craft, Combined Ops. were out of the question for the time being, as all ranks had become exceedingly keen.
During the time we were training at Madh, the Japs had been decisively beaten around Kohima and Imphal and also in the Arakan, and the counter-offensive against them was gathering way. We were not surprised, therefore, to hear that we were to brush up our jungle warfare training once more, and prepare to move up to join the 14th Army on the Burma border.
A period of intensive re-organisation followed, during the monsoon, the Battalion being located at Nasik at the time. Not only were we made up to full strength, but drastic alterations in the Battalion establishment were made, particularly as regards transport. The Carrier Platoon was disbanded, its personnel forming a new Defence Platoon for Battalion H.Q., and the Mortar Platoon also lost its carriers, their place being taken by mules. Our M.T. was reduced to jeeps and trailers, and we formed an A.T. Section with 41 mules. This, as will be understood, was a very low scale of transport which, while undoubtedly suitable in dense jungle country with poor or non-existent roads, was to prove inconveniently limited when casualties had occurred, and particularly when more open country was reached and there was more scope for the use of M.T. The original plan was that the Battalion transport would be supplemented by 54 first line mules from the R.I.A.S.C., but in practice no hard-and-fast allotment was practicable, extra jeeps and trailers sometimes being provided instead.
The shortage of transport made it necessary to carry only the absolute minimum of kit, and all stores were strictly limited. In many cases we cut down on our W.E.T. Officers and men alike could only take with them what they were able to carry on their backs in their large packs, and clothing was limited to one suit only. Bedding consisted of one blanket, one ground sheet, and one mosquito net per man, these being carried on mules in section or equivalent bundles. The general plan of the allotment of transport was that the 3in. Mortars, company reserve ammunition, cooking equipment, and bedding were carried on mules, together with a proportion of Signal and Medical stores, while the Battalion reserve ammunition and Q Stores were carried in jeeps and trailers. It was, of course, necessary to keep a flexible outlook, and on occasions the Battalion operated on an entirely M.T. or A.T. basis as tactical considerations required.
It was in October that the Battalion at last left Nasik, to concentrate with the rest of the Division, at Mile 113 on the Kohima-Imphal road, scene of bitter fighting a few months previously. The C.O. went up ahead of the Battalion early in the month, to get advanced information of the tasks and conditions awaiting us, and the Advance Party left soon after him, but the bulk of the Battalion did not leave until the 19th. It was a long and complicated journey, comprising a railway move across India to Sirajganj Chat on the Brahmaputra River, a steamer trip up the river to Pandu, a second railway journey on to railhead at Dimapur (Manipur Road), and finally a long night drive by M.T. up the famous Manipur Road to our destination a few miles short of Imphal itself. This last stage of the journey took us through the Kohima battlefield, where the 7th Battalion had distinguished itself in the summer, but unfortunately as it was dark we saw nothing much. The whole move took about ten days. As, however, the M.T. had moved separately, driving right across India, and the mules also, by special train, after the rest of the Battalion, it was not until the beginning of November that the various parts of the Battalion had joined up once more, and we were awaiting orders to move forward.
At this time, the distribution of command and appointments— within the Battalion was as follows:-
Commanding Officer Lt.-Col. B. C. Symes, O.B.E. (Dorsets).
Second-in-Command Major R. H. Riddell (R. Berks).
Adjutant Capt. I. T. Fisher (Worc. R.).
O.C. “A” Coy. Major C. P. Tipler (Worc. R.).
O.C. “B” Coy. Major W. Page (Cambridgeshires).
O.C. “C” Coy. Major R. D. Pritchard (Worc. R.).
O.C. “D” Coy. Major A. M. Dawe (Worc. R.).
O.C. H.Q. Coy. Capt. B. E. St. L. Stuart (Worc. R.).
O.C. Adm. Coy. Capt. D. D. Whitmore (Worc. R.).
Intelligence Officer Capt. F. J. Lord (Worc. R.).
Signals Officer Lieut. D. C. Lunn-Rockliffe (Worc. R.).
Mortar Officer Capt. A. Maycock (Worc. R.).
Transport Officer Capt. W. D. Higgins (Worc. R.).
Quartermaster Lieut. C. Lockey (Som. L.I.).
It may be mentioned here that changes both in officers and men were frequent even at this time before any casualties had occurred, owing to repatriation of those with long service overseas, a policy which, while undoubtedly necessary for the morale of the Army as a whole, made the maintenance of an efficient unit extremely difficult, particularly as so often those who were repatriated were senior officers or N.C.O.’s who could ill be spared. As regards the list given above, most of the officers had been with the Battalion for some time. Col. Symes, who had seen service in France in 1940 with the 2nd Division and later with the 2nd Bn. Border Regiment on the Imphal front in 1943, came to the Battalion straight from the last-named unit and thus had valuable first-hand experience of the enemy we were up against, and had been with us exactly a year. The two newest joined were Major Riddell, who came to the Battalion at Nasik in June, and Lieut. (Q.M.) Lockey, who had also joined at Nasik, but as late as August.